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Abstract 
This paper analyses if European citizens are willing to show solidarity with debt-ridden EU 
member states during the recent crisis. Based on a theoretical concept comprehending four di-
mensions of solidarity - generalised willingness to support, existence of social cleavages, rea-
sons of supporting others, acceptance of conditions a crisis country has to meet to receive as-
sistance - we derived hypotheses stating that the existence of a European wide solidarity is 
rather unlikely. We analysed data from two Eurobarometer surveys 2010 and 2011 and a unique 
survey conducted in Germany and Portugal in 2012. Descriptive and multilevel analyses indi-
cated that in 2010 and 2011, a narrow majority of all EU citizens supported fiscal assistance for 
crisis countries, and socio-economic and cultural cleavages in attitudes regarding financial as-
sistance for crisis countries were rather low. Findings from the two country comparison showed 
that the willingness to show solidarity was predominantly guided by moral reasoning instead 
of the respondent’s self-interest. However, German and Portuguese respondents disagree on 
austerity measures, with the exception of social spending cuts. Taken all together, we come to 
the conclusion that recent years have brought a new legitimacy to the use of EU bailout 
measures which are now a given European practice. 
 
Keywords 
Attitudes towards solidarity, bail-outs, Eurobarometer, legitimacy, sovereign debt crisis, survey 
research 
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With the Euro and sovereign debt crises, the European Union (EU) has experienced one of the 
worst crisis since its inception. Whereas some observers criticised political measures taken by 
the EU to address the crisis as being cautiously insufficient (e.g. Giddens, 2014; Streeck, 2014), 
others argue that they demonstrate another step towards a deeper integration of the European 
Union (i.e. Gerhards and Lengfeld 2015). Within only three years, the interdiction of “bailout” 
for individual member states’ sovereign debts was de facto overturned. Since then, the wealthier 
Eurozone members have made enormous financial resources available to the debt-ridden mem-
ber states, with these loans and guarantees leading to a hitherto unseen degree of intra-European 
wealth redistribution. Additionally, national economic, labour and social policies are to a large 
extent no longer determined by national governments, but by European and international insti-
tutions. One could assume that the crisis has pushed a previously unseen extent of solidarity 
and thus has strengthened the social dimension of the European integration.  
There is little doubt that the different measures adopted by the EU follow the principle of self-
serving assistance (Gerhards/Lengfeld 2015: 2): in order to protect the Eurozone, the affluent 
EU core countries support the crisis countries. However, the fact that self-interest plays an im-
portant role in the willingness to help the economically struggling countries and their citizens 
does not necessarily mean these are not acts of solidarity. Assisting others out of self-interest is 
also a form of solidarity (cf. Mau, 2006) and represents presumably the most important one in 
the European context. The affluent EU countries consent to assist the other EU countries with 
their deficits, for which they otherwise have no direct responsibility to pay. 
In this paper, we assume that financial assistance for crisis countries organised and forced by 
EU and IMF can be only sustainable if it is also supported by the citizens of Europe. Their 
beliefs in the legitimacy of financial assistance may influence whether the EU and its member 
states will be able to cope with the crisis by further integration, or whether sovereign debt crisis 
will destabilise some of the member countries (i.e. the “donor” ones) or the EU as a whole. 
Therefore, we raise the question whether Europeans are willing to show solidarity with heavily 
indebted EU member states.1 Relying on the distinction between system and social integration 
we formulated a broader solidarity concept which we used to formulate testable hypotheses. 
The analysed data stem from two Eurobarometer waves and from a unique survey we conducted 
in Germany and Portugal in 2012. Findings reveal that in 2010 and 2011, a narrow majority of 
                                                          
1 Recently published studies explained differences in attitudes toward specific policy-related instruments like 
Eurobonds (Daniele and Geys, 2012; Kuhn and Stoeckel, 2014) or focussed on citizens’ views toward bail-outs 
relying on data from one EU country (Bechtel et al., 2014). However, to our knowledge, there is no comprehen-
sive study investigating the different dimensions of solidarity beliefs based on a theoretically derived concept we 
aimed at. 
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all surveyed EU citizens supported fiscal assistance for crisis countries. In lieu of this, we iden-
tified some socio-economic cleavages regarding bailouts, but they were rather small. Further-
more, persons showing solidarity were predominantly motivated by moral instead of utilitarian 
reasoning. Finally, citizens of donor and crisis states did not strongly disagree on austerity 
measures regarding social spending, but rather on public sector expenditure cuts. To sum up, 
findings by and large indicate that, according to our theoretical concept, the normative founda-
tions of a European solidarity seem to already be established, and the crises unexpectedly may 
have strengthened the social dimension of the European integration. 
 
A brief concept of European solidarity beliefs 
Although solidarity is seen as one of the core pillars of a well-organised society, there is no 
common understanding of the phenomenon due to different theoretical traditions, varying social 
and spatial contexts (social networks and classes, local communities, regions and states) and 
different institutions like welfare state regimes, regional federations or military alliances (Mau, 
2006). For our purposes, David Lockwood’s (1971) seminal distinction between system inte-
gration and social integration is an appropriate starting point for developing a concept of Euro-
pean solidarity beliefs. Whereas system integration refers to the act of combining or adding 
different parts of a social system to make an institutional compatible unit, social integration is 
linked to individual perspectives of cooperation and conflict in a social system. When applying 
this distinction to the sovereign debt crisis, solidarity is linked to both dimensions of societal 
integration. In a systemic perspective, solidarity is practiced with financial means - providing 
grants, loans or debt guarantees - in order to avoid bankruptcy of crisis countries, and is imple-
mented and enforced by EU institutions, member state governments and the IMF. Regarding 
social integration, solidarity “means a sharing of feelings, interests, risks and responsibilities” 
(Schuyt 1998: 297). These common ideas of mutual risks and perceived responsibilities can 
function as a stabiliser for the institutional mechanisms of providing help at the systemic level. 
Applied to the crisis, European solidarity would be existent if the citizens of the territory of the 
European Union are willing to support member states facing severe economic troubles and thus 
back the EU’s redistributive policies. 
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Interestingly, the opinions and attitudes of the European citizens hardly played a decisive role 
in the management of the European crisis. They are only indirectly involved in the decision-
making processes, via the national governments they have elected and the members of the Eu-
ropean parliament (which played a rather insignificant role during the crisis). Thus, citizens' 
impacts on the decision-making process is minimal, despite these decisions being made over 
billions of Euros that, in the worst case, will be transferred from some countries of the EU to 
others, and that eventually must be paid with their own productive capacities (i.e. taxes). Like-
wise, they were not consulted and included in the decisions regarding austerity measures (i.e. 
reductions in what their governments provide). In the following we suggest a multidimensional 
concept of solidarity beliefs aimed at measuring attitudes being resilient in terms of European 
political decision making processes. This concept consists of four dimensions: generalised will-
ingness to support, existence of social cleavages, reasons of support, and acceptance of condi-
tions a crisis country has to meet for receiving assistance. 
 
Generalised willingness 
Political elites have to act in compliance with their national citizens’ attitudes and needs. Alt-
hough public opinion may have little direct effect on concrete policy making in Brussels 
(Hooghe and Marks, 2009; Toshkov, 2011), in the long run people’s beliefs may influence 
whether the EU and its member states will be able to cope with crisis by further integration, or 
whether the sovereign debt crisis will destabilise some of the member countries (i.e. the “donor” 
ones) or the EU as a whole (Cabral, 2013; Gerodimos, 2013; Kriesi, 2012). Therefore, sustain-
able measures of European solidarity must not only rely upon a consensus between national 
governments at the EU level, but also on the support of the majority of all EU citizens. Thus, 
we assume majoritarian acceptance of the general idea of assisting member states facing tre-
mendous economic troubles as a first and necessary condition of European solidarity. 
 
Cleavages 
It is not sufficient, however, to indicate solidarity only by majoritarian approval. Even then, 
minorities objecting to Europeanised solidarity may form socio-economical or cultural homo-
geneous groups which may become powerful forces in politics. Following Lipset and Rokkan 
(1967), cleavages pooling the most dissatisfied citizens can be picked up by political groups 
and parties and thus transmitted into the decision-making process. If strong cleavages emerge, 
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political efforts to strengthen mechanisms of financial support may run into a strong opposition. 
As previous research showed, two conflict lines toward processes of Europeanisation are likely 
to occur: cleavages linked to the socio-economic status of citizens, and cleavages based on 
value orientations (Ferrera, 2005; Kriesi et al., 2008; Fligstein, 2008; Gerhards and Lengfeld, 
2013, 2015). Therefore, a politically resilient concept of European solidarity has to account for 
those cleavages. Accordingly, European solidarity is conditional on socio-economic and cul-
tural cleavages being weak or even absent. 
 
Reasons 
People may assign different motives for supporting others (i.e. Schwartz and Howard, 1982; 
Hechter, 1987). In the case of European solidarity beliefs, two contrasting rationales can be 
distinguished (Mau, 2006; Hooghe and Marks, 2005; de Vries and van Kersbergen, 2007). On 
the one hand, providing help may meet self-seeking interests. Citizens may approve of EU res-
cue funds under the assumption that they will ensure the prosperity of the individual or his 
country, regardless of belonging to a assisting or receiving country. We name this motive “util-
itarian”. In contrast, individuals’ judgements may be motivated by morality. Here, two subtypes 
have to be distinguished. The first “civic” type was recently mentioned by Jürgen Habermas. 
He assumes that European solidarity has to be based on equal rights, allowing all Europeans to 
participate in resources covered by the European nation-states and take part in a non-coercive 
discourse of free and equal citizens (Habermas, 2012: 46). The second moral motive stems from 
the principle of “reciprocity” usually known from social policy schemes. Here, the giver expects 
that in the future, others will treat him with similar benevolence. We call this type “reciprocal”. 
Following Max Weber’s well-known idea of political legitimation, we assume European soli-
darity to be more resilient if citizens’ believe in moral, “wertrational” than in utilitarian, 
“zweckrational” reasons. If help becomes costly over time, i.e. due to loan default or by reason 
that austerity measures give rise to unemployment in crisis countries, utilitarians may be more 
likely to change their minds than persons relying on moral convictions. Thus, the more support-
ers refer to civic or reciprocal as opposed to utilitarian reasoning, the more durable is the polit-
ical legitimacy of the EU’s institutionalized help. 
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Conditions of assistance 
This last dimension of solidarity does not refer to the legitimacy of solidarity in general, but 
focuses on the conditions under which financial assistance to a crisis country would be pro-
vided. These conditions can be considered a political minefield on which the expectations of 
citizens’ from assistance providing and receiving countries may clash. Citizens of assisting 
countries may explicitly want the EU to negotiate far-reaching measures to ensure that the crisis 
country does everything in its power to overcome sovereign debt. This could be done by exe-
cuting structural economic, fiscal and social welfare reforms to strengthen the countries' pro-
spective economic performance, and/or by taking responsibility for keeping down costs (i.e. 
Rogers and Vasilopoulou, 2012; Hardiman and Reagan, 2013). Citizens from crisis countries, 
however, may tend to reject fiscal restrictions which are considered as a threat to individuals’ 
purses as well as national wealth, as recently happened in Greece and Portugal (Gerodimos, 
2013; Kriesi, 2012: 521). Thus, the more givers and receivers are divided over conditions of 
assistance, the more complicated political negotiations on financial rescue packages between 
the EU and governments of member states will be in the future. 
 
Hypotheses 
To what degree does empirical reality correspond to this concept of European solidarity? Ac-
cording to recent developments, it is questionable if the conditions described above are fulfilled. 
By using our concept as a yardstick, we formulate four hypotheses which, in sum, suggest a 
rather sceptical picture of solidarity. 
 
Generalised willingness 
Since 1986, after enacting the Single European Act, the EU’s redistributive policy was mainly 
focused on territorial cohesion measures (Mau, 2006), using regional and structural funds in 
order to economically aid underdeveloped NUTS-II regions. EU rescue funds EFSF and ESM, 
in contrast, basically reallocate between national budgets. Thus they constituted a breach, with 
the interdiction of no bailout from the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU, by infringing upon 
the principle of national budget sovereignty. Additionally, solidarity between citizens typically 
relies on strong cultural bonds like common social values or a shared history (Bayertz, 1999; 
Faist, 2001). These cultural bonds are predominantly anchored at the regional and the national 
levels but not at the European level. However, rescue funds would come into conflict with the 
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organically evolved symbolic codes, moral bindings and collective identity definitions prevail-
ing in the respective nations. Thus, a strong European identity seems to be needed as a prereq-
uisite for the willingness of transnational solidarity. As survey research shows, such identity 
does not seem to exist (Fligstein, 2009). Thus, the existence of strong transnational ties is not 
very likely. 
H1: A majority of EU citizens reject provision of financial help to European crisis coun-
tries. 
 
Cleavages 
It is a matter of fact that European integration has changed the distribution of wealth between 
citizens holding different socio-economic positions (Gabel and Palmer, 1995; Ferrera, 2005; 
Fligstein, 2008). In North-western EU countries, the opening of borders for goods, services and 
labour has given rise to economic competition, which in turn put pressure on workers disposing 
of low human capital. Due to the fact that their dependencies on welfare state service has in-
creased over time (Edlund, 2007), they will expect their government to enhance employment 
and fight against poverty at home and not abroad. Likewise, social spending curbs, reduction 
of jobs and the capping of salaries notably in the public sector all threatened the most econom-
ically vulnerable living in the crisis countries. Thus, in both donor and crisis countries, partic-
ularly the economically most vulnerable citizens may have good reasons for opposing bailouts. 
Accordingly, the low educated, the low skilled, and the unemployed are assumed to be more 
likely to reject the idea of European solidarity. 
H2a: Citizens lower in socio-economic status are more opposed to the idea of European-
ised solidarity. 
Willingness to show solidarity may also vary with a country’s economic performance. The less 
affluent a country is, the more its citizens will refuse fiscal transfers, by arguing that scarce 
resources should be used for national purposes first. Here, a recent incident is instructive. In 
2011 European leaders wanted to expand size and powers of the EFSF rescue fund, but the 
parliament of Eurozone member Slovakia refused to participate in the loan facility. According 
to newspaper reports, Mr. Sulik, the speaker of the Slovak parliament, stated that it is unfair to 
ask Slovakia, the second-poorest country of the Eurozone, to guarantee loans for relatively 
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wealthier Greece and Portugal.2 This example shows that for citizens from poorer countries, 
providing financial assistance to wealthier countries may contradict the very idea of solidarity. 
H2b: The lower a country’s wealth, the less likely its individuals support European soli-
darity. 
An individuals’ fundamental political orientation may influence whether or not European inte-
gration is supported (De Vries and Edwards, 2009). For the right-wing oriented, the nation-state 
is the only legitimate entity to provide solidarity to nationals. Thus, EU bailouts will be seen as 
a threat to national sovereignty (Bechtel et al., 2014). Persons with leftist orientations will also 
object to rescue funds, but for reasons of blaming the EU for ransoming banks instead of di-
rectly supporting citizens. 
H2c: People with strong rightist and leftist political opinions refuse European solidarity, 
compared to citizens ascribing themselves to the political centre. 
 
Reasons 
As a matter of fact, European integration predominantly has been a project of mutual material 
interest to increase the wealth of member states by establishing a common market and reducing 
trade barriers. The same applies to EU policies carried out during the crisis. Foremost, rescue 
funds have been established to prevent Eurozone member states from banking collapses that 
threaten the use of a common currency. When individual beliefs of citizens are supposed to be 
in line with EU policy rationales, the utilitarian motive is to be considered as the deciding mo-
tive, well beyond civic or reciprocity solidarity motives.  
H3: Individual support of EU fiscal assistance is predominantly driven by utilitarian rea-
soning as opposed to moral motives of civic and of reciprocal solidarity. 
 
Conditions 
As assumed above, the more citizens from assistance providing and receiving countries diverge 
on austerity measures, the more political bargaining on rescue funds may become conflictual. 
Thus, great discrepancies indicate a lack of European solidarity. To identify the extent of dis-
crepancies, we have to look at different policy fields affected most by these measures. These 
                                                          
2 “Slovakia Rejects Euro Bailout” New York Times, 11.10.2011; http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/12/world/eu-
rope/slovak-leader-vows-to-resign-if-bailout-vote-fails.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 
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may be reduction of public expenditures by decreasing employment in the public sector, pri-
vatisation of state property, reducing the social welfare system’s generosity (through benefit 
cuts or raising the retirement age), imposing tax increases or other structural reforms (i.e. re-
ducing expenditures for public infrastructure). 
Due to virulent political conflicts in some of the crisis countries, we assume attitudinal diver-
gences between assisting and receiving countries to be greatest regarding social welfare cuts. 
Citizens of receiving countries are directly affected by these measures, while citizens from as-
sisting countries may estimate these measures as effective means to fight sovereign debt. A 
somewhat smaller difference may occur regarding a cost reduction in the public sector, because 
this does not directly affect all citizens of crisis countries (e.g. by a reduced number of public 
servants). In contrast, cuts in infrastructural development may be most tolerable for citizens of 
both donor and receiving countries, because this aims at reducing public deficit, but may not be 
seen as affecting the individual budgets of citizens. 
H4: Divergences in attitudes towards austerity measures between citizens of donor and 
crisis states are greatest regarding cuts in social welfare, in contrast to less polarization 
over cuts to public sector expenditures and infrastructure. 
 
Data, Variables, and Methods 
Data 
We used data from three surveys. The first two are from the Eurobarometer EB 74.1 carried out 
in November 2010 and the EB 76.1 (September 2011). Based on representative national sam-
ples, random route design and face-to-face questioning technique, in 2011 26,856 Europeans 
(in 2010: 26,635) aged 15 or older were interviewed (European Commission, 2011; European 
Parliament, 2012).3 Both surveys contained a question on general willingness to show solidar-
ity. We used this item for testing hypothesis H1. To prove cleavage related hypotheses (H2a-
c), we merged both data sets and analysed the multivariate impact of several variables indicating 
socio-economic and cultural cleavages (see details below). 
However, Eurobarometer surveys do not contain specific questions on solidarity motives (H3) 
and austerity measures (H4). Thus, in 2012 we carried out a unique survey called “Fiscal Soli-
                                                          
3 In our Eurobarometer analyses we include persons aged 18 or older only in order to ensure comparability with 
the FSEU survey (see below). 
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darity in the European Union” (FSEU). For financial reasons, the FSEU survey has been re-
stricted to two Eurozone members. Germany was chosen because of its fiscal strength and cen-
tral economic position for the whole Eurozone and its relative share of contributions to EFSF 
and ESM. Portugal was selected as a representative of a loans receiving country which widely 
complied with the fiscal consolidation measures negotiated with the IMF and EU, and there has 
been no serious public insurrection at the date of data collection 2012. 
After translating the German master questionnaire into Portuguese and an additional check by 
a translating bureau, questionnaires were inserted into two omnibus surveys carried out by TNS 
infratest dimap and TNS Portugal. Respondents eligible to vote and aged 18 or over have been 
chosen from national standard list-assisted random digit dialling (RDD) and interviewed using 
CATI technique. The survey has been carried out in July 2012. In each country, 1,000 inter-
views were completed.4  
 
Core Variables 
The following item of EB 74.1/76.1 was used to test hypotheses H1 and H2a-c: “In times of 
crisis, it is desirable for [Country name] to give financial help to another EU Member State 
facing severe financial and economic difficulties” (totally agree, tend to agree, tend to disagree, 
totally disagree, don’t know).5 
In order to measure solidarity motives according to hypothesis H3, the FSEU survey asked 
respondents to rate the following three items on the same scale used by Eurobarometer: “There 
are many reasons to state for or against fiscal help for EU member countries in trouble. What 
do you think about the following statements?” [rotating order]. “Financial help also is econom-
ically beneficial for our country” [utilitarian solidarity] / “It is our moral duty to help other 
member states that are in need” [civic solidarity] / “The European Union member states should 
help each other, as somewhere along the way every country may require help” [reciprocal sol-
idarity]. 
                                                          
4 Net response rates were 45.4 per cent in Germany and 21.0 per cent in Portugal. The lower response rate in 
Portugal may be explained by the higher degree of individual shocks the crisis evoked in Portugal, especially by 
the lower educated and those of low socio-economic position, meaning that these people have been stressed out 
by answering questions about the crisis. Thus, data have been weighted according to age groups, sex, region, 
urbanisation and educational degree. 
5 In the FSEU survey we replicated this question, with a slight difference in wording, using the same rating scale: 
In times of crisis, [Germany/Portugal] shall give financial help to other EU member states facing severe financial 
and economic problems”. 
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Linked to hypothesis H4, preferences toward austerity measures were surveyed using a list of 
suggested reasons to provide financial help. “Generally, countries in fiscal trouble are de-
manded to tackle their national budget in order to receive help. To what extent do you agree 
with the following proposals? If the EU country wants to receive financial assistance, then it 
should … [rotating order] “cut social spending” / “cut pensions” / “reduce expenditures for 
public infrastructure, i.e. road construction” / “cut wages for federal employees” / “raise taxes” 
/ “fire federal employees” / “increase working hours and age of retirement” / “pass state prop-
erty into private hands”. 
 
Independent variables, related to cleavage hypotheses6 
As done in other studies, the respondent’s socio-economic status (H2a) is operationalised by 
education and labour market position (Bechtel et al., 2014; Kuhn and Stoeckel, 2014). In Euro-
barometer surveys, educational attainment is measured by the respondent’s age when leaving 
full time education, recoded to low (0-15 years), medium (16-19 years) and high education (20 
years and more), and to persons still studying. The labour market position is operationalised by 
workforce status (employed, unemployed not in labour force) and occupational position, ac-
cording to Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992). 
To test country level hypothesis H2b on the impact of wealth, we included the gross domestic 
product (2010) per capita (in PPP) to the merged EB 74.1/76.1 dataset. Additionally, we in-
serted another two macro variables, controlling for the extent to which a country is hit by sov-
ereign debt. According to the self-interest of citizens from heavily indebted countries to cope 
with a bad fiscal situation, we assume approval of solidarity is higher in countries already re-
ceiving loans or in those with a high debt ratio. We thus inserted three dummy variables to the 
regression saying whether in 2010 a country was receiving loans, contributing to loans, or nei-
ther. Additionally, the ratio of total central government debt (as percentage of GDP 2010) was 
included. Accounting for debt leads to a net effect of wealth, to determine if citizens from af-
fluent countries are more generous. Finally, a dummy indicates the wave of the data to account 
for unexplained changes of approval in solidarity from 2010 to 2011. 
To identify potential cultural cleavages (H2c), Eurobarometer asked for the respondent’s polit-
ical orientation, operationalised by self-placement on the left-right scale (1 = far left, 10 = far 
                                                          
6 For variable descriptions see table A2 in appendix. 
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right). To test for a non-linear U-curved effect, we additionally inserted a squared term to the 
regression. 
Additionally, age and gender as control variables are included in the analysis. 
 
Methods 
In order to test H1, we displayed relative frequencies of EB 76.1 (2011) interviewees’ willing-
ness to show solidarity and compared them with data from EB 74.1 (2010) to identify changes 
over time. To detect cleavages (H2a-c), we ran random intercept regressions accounting for 
contextual effects and nesting of individuals at the country level (Snijders and Bosker, 2012). 
As the dependent variable of generalised willingness to show solidarity is discrete, we per-
formed ordered probit models, carried out by the Stata command “gllamm”. Due to the fact that 
multilevel ordinal proportional odds models are difficult to fit, we followed the advice of 
Snijders and Bosker (2012: 312) and compared the outcomes for (1) versus (2 3 4), (1 2) versus 
(3 4), and (1 2 3) versus (4). Additionally, total explained and unexplained variances at both 
levels are shown (ibid: 305ff.). 
According to H3, we displayed approval rates on reasons of solidarity included in the FSEU 
survey, sorted by country. In order to indicate to what degree motives are linked to the gener-
alised indicator of European solidarity (see above), we grouped respondents depending on 
whether they show solidarity in general, and how they approve of different motives. We addi-
tionally carried out tests of proportions to examine significant group differences. To account 
for the problem of multiple comparisons, we adjusted the group-related significance levels fol-
lowing the Holm-Bonferroni method (Holm 1979).  
To validate H4, we calculated relative frequencies of surveyed austerity measures, sorted by 
country, and tested for significant country differences as described above.7 
 
  
                                                          
7 We also ran a principal component factor analysis to account for latent variables. We found a three factor solution 
(see Table A.1 in the appendix) which we then used to sort the single items for presenting the descriptive findings. 
We also calculated comparisons of means based on the factor scores. Results confirmed findings from frequency 
analysis. Factorised means though are hard to compare according to different lengths of scale. Thus we did not 
display them but they are available on request. 
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Results 
According to hypothesis H1, Figure 1 shows the general willingness of respondents to express 
solidarity. The length of the bars signals approval rates from 2011. On the left of each bar, the 
relative change from 2010 to 2011 is indicated. Data show that in 2011 a narrow majority of 
54.7 per cent of EU-27 citizens supported financial assistance for crisis countries, and in 17 out 
of 27 countries supporters were in the majority. However, remarkable country differences in 
support emerged, ranging from 75 per cent in Luxembourg and 26.8 per cent in Slovenia. When 
grouping countries by duration of EU membership, findings demonstrate that nine out of ten 
countries refusing the idea of fiscal solidarity joined the Union in 2004 or later. Thus, findings 
suggest a cleavage between the older and the newer member states which may be explained by 
wealth differences. 
Figure 1 further reveals that from 2010 to 2011 the number of EU-27 citizens showing solidarity 
only slightly decreased (-1.5). This change is mainly caused by a decrease in the EU-15 coun-
tries (-1.1), whereas in the enlargement countries support even grew (+3.5). Besides this, it is 
hard to identify a coherent change pattern. When comparing Eurozone member states, there 
was no clear change at the aggregated level. In some of the wealthier countries support in-
creased (Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Germany) whereas it decreased in others (Italy, Austria, 
Finland). The same pattern is observed for loan receiving countries (increase in Greece, de-
crease in Portugal, Ireland and Cyprus).  
Thus, although the crisis got worse from 2010 to 2011, a narrow majority was still willing to 
support financial assistance in 2011. Additionally, the gap between citizens from old and new 
member states diminished over time. Taken all together, H1, which denied majoritarian support 
for European solidarity, has to be rejected. 
  
 16 
 
Figure 1 Generalised willingness to show solidarity (relative frequencies) 
 
Notes: Source: EB 74.1 (N = 18,430) and EB 76.1 (N = 19,837), adults only, own calculations, relative frequencies 
of 2011 approval rates are displayed (both approval categories have been merged; without d.k.-answers). In the 
left of the bars, relative change from 2010 to 2011 is shown; weighted, rounded. 
 
In order to detect potential cleavages (H2a-c), Table 1 displays step-wise extended ordered 
probit random intercept regressions. Displayed odds ratios (OR) indicate a negative (positive) 
effect if OR<1 (OR>1). Model 1 shows that support for heavily indebted member states slightly 
fell from 2010 to 2011. Furthermore, probability to show solidarity increased with duration of 
attending school, but people still studying or serving apprenticeships were more supportive than 
the high-educated. This effect can be traced back to the opportunities to study abroad the EU 
offers to trainees and university students. Despite this, concealed cohort effects are unlikely, as 
we controlled for the respondent’s age. 
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Findings further reveal a solidarity gap between the professional classes and all other occupa-
tional positions, including the unemployed and the inactive. This finding is in line with results 
from other research (Fligstein, 2008; Ferrera, 2005), saying that persons who do not benefit 
from opening borders and whose dependence on the welfare state has increased over time are 
more opposing of the general idea of European integration. Taken together both educational 
and class effects findings confirm H2a which stated that the economically most vulnerable peo-
ple oppose European solidarity. In contrast to H2c, there is no significant effect of political 
attitudes, meaning that neither citizens with a strong rightist or leftist orientation tended to deny 
financial support, compared to those at the political centre. 
However, the explained variance of Model 1 is very low. Individual level variables only account 
for 2.8 per cent of the total variance, and 84.1 per cent of the total unexplained variance is 
located at the individual level. This indicates that the potential for political cleavages according 
to socio-economic status and political attitudes of the individuals was rather low. 
When accounting for differences in the socio-economic composition of the countries, Model 2 
indicates that respondents living in a loan receiving country (2010: Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, 
Portugal) were more likely to show solidarity, compared to countries either contributing to EU 
funds or doing neither. Model 3 indicates a negative impact of the debt ratio (as a percentage 
of GDP), and model 4 reveals a positive effect of GDP. However, when simultaneously taking 
all macro variables into account, debt ratio turned to a slightly positive impact on solidarity, 
with GDP and crisis dummies remaining constant. According to bivariate calculations, interac-
tion of GDP and debt ratio does not indicate strong multi-collinearity (b=.179; R²=.03). This 
means that the debt ratio did not only vary between the wealthier EU-15 and the poorer EU-12 
countries, but also within the group of the affluent EU countries to a remarkable degree. Thus, 
when controlling for debt, there was a clear effect of wealth on European solidarity as stated by 
H2b.  
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Table 1 Determinants of attitudes towards fiscal solidarity (ordered probit random intercept 
regressions) 
 M0 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 
 OR/(se) OR/(se) OR/(se) OR/(se) OR/(se) OR/(se) 
Wave (1 = 2011)  0.919*** 0.922*** 0.922*** 0.921*** 0.926*** 
  (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Age (in years)  1.001 1.001 1.001 1.001 1.001 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Gender (Ref.: male)  0.925** 0.925*** 0.924*** 0.925*** 0.924*** 
  (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Education  
(Ref.: over 20 years) 
      
In apprenticeship/  1.122** 1.133** 1.131*** 1.132** 1.136** 
study at university  (0.045) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) 
0-15 years  0.690*** 0.705*** 0.712*** 0.713*** 0.710*** 
  (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) 
16-19 years  0.778*** 0.803*** 0.808*** 0.799*** 0.806*** 
  (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Socio-economic status 
(Ref.: Professionals) 
      
Intermediate class  0.929** 0.922*** 0.923** 0.92*** 0.918*** 
  (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) 
Petty Bourgeoisie  0.869*** 0.841*** 0.850*** 0.853*** 0.851*** 
  (0.022) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) 
Working class  0.847*** 0.829*** 0.827*** 0.831*** 0.827*** 
  (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.022) 
Unemployed   0.872*** 0.855*** 0.854*** 0.861*** 0.856*** 
  (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) 
Not in workforce  0.879*** 0.866*** 0.868*** 0.864*** 0.864*** 
  (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
Left right placement 
(1=far left, 10=far right) 
 1.0003 1.004 1.007 1.01 1.003 
  (0.011) (0.121) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Left right placement squared  0.999 0.998 0.998 0.998* 0.998 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Country group (Ref.: Receiver)       
Donor   0.823*** 0.783*** 0.724*** 0.871*** 
   (0.02) (0.021) (0.019) (0.024) 
Neutral   0.845*** 0.813*** 0.755*** 0.816*** 
   (0.02) (0.019) (0.018) (0.021) 
       
Debt ratio    0.999***  1.001*** 
    (0.0002)  (0.0002) 
GDP (per head)     1.003*** 1.003*** 
     (0.0002) (0.0002) 
-2LL 53598.2 53056.5 52912 52897.7 52896.8 52874.8 
Explained variance  2.8 % 3 % 3.1 % 5.2 % 4.7 % 
Unexplained variance 
at individual level  
 84.1 % 93.4 % 93.1 % 90.6 % 91.8 % 
Unexplained variance 
at country level  
 13.1 % 3.5 % 3.8 % 4.2 % 3.5 % 
Notes: Source: merged Eurobarometer 74.1/76.1, Eurostat 2010/2011, N = 38,267, adults only, own calculations; 
odds ratios are displayed (standard errors in parentheses), * pt < .05, ** pt < .01, *** pt < .001. 
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In sum, the more affluent a country, the more citizens supported generosity toward countries in 
need. Moreover, macro level effects do not indicate strong potentials for political conflicts. 
Although unexplained between-country variance was relatively low, insertion of macro varia-
bles gave a considerable decrease to it. However, it contributed to overall explained variance to 
a small extent only. This brings us to the conclusion that in the beginning of 2010, the proba-
bility of cleavages concerning European solidarity was rather low. 
Table 2 depicts specific reasons for solidarity among German and Portuguese respondents, ac-
cording to FSEU data. More than 81 per cent of Germans and almost 90 per cent of Portuguese 
agreed with reciprocity whereby member states “should help each other, as somewhere along 
the way every country may require help”. A smaller majority supported the other two motives 
with 63 per cent of the Germans and 73.4 per cent of the Portuguese endorsing the civic soli-
darity motive, whereas 64.8 per cent in Germany and 70.6 per cent in Portugal indicated utili-
tarian reasoning. When looking at differences between the proponents and opponents of gener-
alised solidarity, approval rates of the former were significantly higher than those of the latter, 
and approval to the reciprocity item exceed 90 per cent in Germany and reached almost 100 per 
cent in Portugal. Even among citizens opposing the general idea of European solidarity, a ma-
jority of respondents supported this motive. All group differences between proponents and op-
ponents are significant (pz < .0001). 
Although the utilitarian argument has more followers in Germany than in Portugal, differences 
between both countries are relatively small. Thus, willingness to show solidarity predominantly 
seemed to rely on moral motives. Although both countries were affected differently by the cri-
sis, we could not obtain significant differences in reasoning. Thus, hypothesis H3 which as-
sumed that European solidarity will be mainly driven by a utilitarian motive is disconfirmed. 
Table 2 Solidarity motives (relative frequencies, approval rates only) 
 
  
N Utilitarian 
solidarity  
Reciprocal 
solidarity 
Civic  
solidarity  
Portugal All respondents 843 70.6 89.7 73.4 
 Proponents of generalised solidarity 374 86.8 97.7 92.5 
 Opponents of generalised solidarity 469 57.8 83.3 58.2 
   z = -9.61*** z =-10.33*** z =-10.93*** 
Germany All respondents 806 64.8 81.5 63.0 
 Proponents of generalised solidarity 453 83.6 96.6 80.6 
 Opponents of generalised solidarity 353 45.6 66.1 44.9 
   z = -12.71*** z = -12.06*** z = -11.69*** 
Source: FSEU 2012; own calculations; both approval categories have been merged; without d.k.-answers; 
weighted, rounded. z-tests (proponents vs. opponents) with individually adjusted alpha errors following the 
Holm-Bonferroni correction, *** pz < .0001. 
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Figure 3 displays austerity preferences according to hypothesis H4. Relative frequencies show 
that German respondents foremost wanted the crisis country to reduce expenditures in the pub-
lic sector. Consequently, 81.3 per cent spoke out for cuts of federal employee’s salaries, 64.1 
per cent favoured lay-offs of civil servants, and 76.2 per cent called for privatisation. In contrast, 
there was no German majority for cutting social benefits (29.6) and pensions (20.3) in the crisis 
country, and only a narrow one for raising taxes (56.5) and increasing working hours and retir-
ing age (53.6). Moreover, Germans by majority did not accept cuts in public infrastructure 
which they might consider as a precondition for economic growth. 
Figure 2 Acceptance of austerity measures (relative frequencies, means, approval rates only) 
 
Source: FSEU Survey 2012; NGermany = 806; NPortugal = 843; own calculations, both approval categories have been 
merged; without d.k.-answers; weighted, rounded. z-tests with individually adjusted alpha errors following the 
Holm-Bonferroni correction, ** pz < .001), *** pz < .0001. 
In Portugal, most approval rates remained much lower than in Germany, obviously due to the 
countries’ situation as receiving loans from rescue funds. The Portuguese rather accepted cuts 
in infrastructure (69.2) and enforcement of privatisation (48.1), both being measures not di-
rectly threatening their household incomes. Yet they strongly refused an increase of taxes 
(15.2), working hours or retiring age (20.7), firing public employees (25.3) and salary cuts for 
clerks (27.8). 
Most important, citizens from both countries agreed to avoid social benefits and pensions cuts. 
This finding supports the notion that the most vulnerable people in a crisis country should not 
be burdened by additional austerities. Contrastingly, both nations were substantially divided 
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over tax increase and public sector cuts, as the length of the bars indicate. This may evolve into 
an explosive political issue at the national or European level, as it did in 2012 and 2013 in 
Portugal and Greece where several general strikes were targeted to withdraw belt-tightening 
measures in public employment.8 Although significant, mean differences regarding infrastruc-
ture cuts may not evoke massive conflicts, inasmuch the Portuguese accepted it to a higher 
degree than the Germans. All country differences were highly significant with pz < .001. In sum, 
hypothesis H4 is not confirmed as not social welfare cuts but costs reductions in the public 
sector divided attitudes regarding austerity measures of citizens of a donor and receiving coun-
try. 
 
Conclusion 
In this paper we raised the question to what extent European citizens are willing to support debt-
ridden EU member states. Based on a concept consisting of four solidarity dimensions - gener-
alised willingness to support, existence of social cleavages, reasons for support, and acceptance 
of conditions a crisis country has to meet for receiving help - we derived hypotheses stating that 
the existence of a European wide solidarity is rather unlikely. Using data from two Eurobarom-
eter waves and from FSEU survey carried out in Germany and Portugal in 2012, analyses sum-
marily did not support our sceptical view. 1) In 2010 a narrow majority of all EU citizens and 
of all EU countries supported financial help for crisis countries. Whilst the crisis deepened from 
2010 to 2011, public support did not shrank to a high degree. 2) Although we observed some 
cleavages related to financial assistance at the individual level, findings indicated that a strong 
mobilisation against European solidarity measures is unlikely. Additionally, citizens from the 
affluent core of the EU were willing to support the poorer ones. This finding notably underlines 
the existence of European solidarity by demonstrating evidence of one of its crucial precondi-
tions: the economically strongest backs the weakest. 3) Findings from FSEU survey reveal that 
when Germans and Portuguese supported financial assistance, they predominately relied on 
“wertrational” instead of “zweckrational” motives. Thus, we expect support of rescue funds to 
be more durable, according to political legitimacy. 4) In both countries a majority disagreed on 
cutting social spending and pensions in the crisis countries, which again supports the notion 
that the givers wanted to avoid the worsening of the economic situation of the poorest. 
                                                          
8 http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/27/us-portugal-strike-transport-idUSBRE95Q09N20130627. 
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In sum, results show that in the years 2010-2012, European solidarity was relatively high, at 
least higher than hypothesised. Thus, within the crisis European integration was not only deep-
ened by building up new institutions of intra-European redistribution and by setting rules of 
regulating the banking sector to avoid future bailouts (systemic integration), but also by the 
legitimacy beliefs of the citizens (social integration). Insofar the crisis has pushed a previously 
unseen extent of solidarity and thus has strengthened the social dimension of the European 
integration.  
Findings nevertheless denoted at least two severe obstacles to European solidarity. 1) At the 
country level, citizens from almost all former socialist countries refused financial assistance for 
crisis countries. This observation may be due to the fact that in all these countries the standard 
of living is lower than in the Southern European crisis countries. This does not compellingly 
mean that Middle Eastern Europeans would refuse solidarity in principle. It rather showed that 
citizens from the economically weakest countries do not consider themselves responsible to 
back the stronger ones – even if they were faced by the crisis. 2) The second obstacle lays in 
the dissent between givers and receivers about acceptability of austerity measures, especially 
salary cuts and lay-offs of federal employees, increase of taxes and working hours or retiring 
age. Some of these measures provoked massive political conflicts in the troubled countries, so 
in 2011 and 2012 as in Greece, unions called national strikes to force the Greek government to 
withdraw pension and wage cuts for public service workers, and riots paralysed much of public 
life (Gerodimos 2013). Whereas citizens of receiving countries strongly rejected these re-
strictions, citizens of assisting countries might explicitly consider them as appropriate to over-
come the crisis. Here, the conflicting positions of the national governments are strongly backed 
up by their peoples’ beliefs. 
However, two serious limitations of these findings must be noted. First, it remains unclear how 
stable solidarity attitudes are over a period of time longer than two years, something which was 
not measurable here due to restrictions of Eurobarometer data. Therefore, if the crisis does not 
pass as expected by the citizens, i.e. due to increasing financial burdens of the citizens, ac-
ceptance rates may decline and discrepancies between donor and receiving countries may in-
crease. Second, our evidence on specific solidarity motives and austerity preferences was based 
only on a two country comparison. Thus, we have to interpret respective results as being ex-
plorative rather than representative for the entire EU. 
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Anhang 
  
Table A1 Austerity measures: latent variables structure 
 
Public  
Sector 
Work  
and Income 
Infra-
structure 
H2 
Privatisation of state property .69 .11 .17 .51 
Federal employee’s salaries cuts .78 .12 .15 .65 
Firing federal employees .80 .08 .03 .64 
Social spending cuts -.04 .69 .32 .58 
Pension cuts .08 .77 .01 .60 
Increase of working hours & retiring age .35 .59 -.21 .52 
Tax increase .38 .59 -.21 .53 
Reduce expenditures for public infra-
structure 
.00 .02 .92 .84 
Eigenvalue 2.62 1.24 1.03  
Note: Source: FSEU 2012, N = 1649, own calculations, principal component analysis with varimax 
rotation. 
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Table A2: Merged Eurobarometer dataset 74.1/76.1: description of variables (N=38,267)* 
 
Variable Range Definition Mean (SD)/ 
Rel. Freq. 
Willingness to 
show solidarity 
1-4 “In times of crisis, it is desirable for [Country name] to 
give financial help to another EU Member State facing se-
vere financial and economic difficulties” 
totally disagree 
tend to disagree 
tend to agree 
totally agree 
 
 
 
19.96 % 
26.54 % 
41.49 % 
12.01 % 
Age 18-95 Age in years 49.53 
(17.31) 
    
Education 1-4 Fulltime education in years: 
0-15 years 
16-19 years 
more than 20 years 
still studying 
 
17.25 % 
44.11 % 
33.46 % 
5.18 % 
 
Occupational 
status 
1-6 professional /managerial 
intermediate class 
petty bourgeoisie 
working class 
unemployed 
not in workforce (incl. student, retired)  
 
14.79 % 
19.84 % 
3.85 % 
11.84 % 
7.77 % 
41.91 % 
Left/right scale 1-10 far left - far right 5.31 (2.15) 
Country group 1-3 Receiver (CY, GR, IRE, PT) 
Donor (AT, BE, DE, EE, ES, FI, FR, IT,  
LU, NL, MT, SI, SK) 
neutral (other) 
Source: EFSF (http://www.efsf.europa.eu/attachments/ 
EFSF%20FAQ%202013-12-09.pdf) 
11.45 % 
49.71 % 
38.84 % 
GDP  44-262 GDP per capita in PPS, 2010 
Source: Eurostat (http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/ 
tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&plugin=1&language= 
en&pcode=tec00114 
99.46 
(34.57) 
Total central 
government 
debt 
6.5-146 total central government debt (% of GDP), 2010. 
Source: Eurostat (http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/ 
tgm/table.do?tab=table&language=en&pcode=teina225 
62.46 
(30.51)  
* For a description of FSEU 2012 variables see ‘Data, Variables, and Methods’ section. 
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